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THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE
INTER-PARTY DEVELOPMENTS AT AND AFTER THE
RUMANIAN WORKERS PARTY CONGRESS--BUCHAREST, 20-25 JUNE 1960

The background of the dispute (1957-1960)

1. The present dispute between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) has its origins in differences ~~between the two parties~~ which date back at least three years ~~that is, to the period in mid 1957~~. On the Chinese side, antecedent resentments may date as far back as the formative period of the CPC in the twenties, when Stalin's ^{of} alliance policy with the Kuomintang drove the CPC to disaster, as well as to the war and early post-war period, when Soviet support for the Chinese Communist cause was minimal and did not inhibit the stripping of Manchuria. ^{There is clearly no} ~~If there is a~~ single cause for the current dispute, ~~it is not known~~. Rather, it would appear, ~~there was an~~ accumulation of Chinese policies and actions ~~which~~ increasingly displeased and challenged Khrushchev and, presumably, a majority of the Soviet leadership. In the field of domestic policy, it is now known that Mao's "Let a hundred flowers bloom" program aroused Soviet doubts about its usefulness. The program for the "great leap forward" ^{beginning in early 1958} and the communes ^{program} adopted by the CPC in May 1958, ^{were} ~~was~~ readily recognizable as a considerable irritant in Sino-Soviet relations by the silent treatment which ~~it~~ ^{they} received in the Soviet Union.

2. Disagreement over foreign policy manifested itself in August 1958 when Khrushchev, after four days discussion with Mao Tse-tung, ^{probably} rejected, on 5 August, Western proposals for a summit meeting within the U. N. Security

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Council on the crisis in the Middle East - proposals which he had accepted in July. Nevertheless, on 23 August the Chinese began shelling of the off-shore islands. On 23 May 1958, the Commander of the Chinese Air Force predicted that China would make atomic bombs "in the not too distant future" and the Chinese press ceased to refer to Khrushchev's earlier plan for an atom-free zone in Asia. Khrushchev revived his concept of an atom-free zone for "the Far East and the entire Pacific Basin" at the 21st CPSU Congress in February 1959. Chinese reactions were not enthusiastic, and, from April 1959, on, references to the plan disappeared altogether. In the light of these and other indications, it can be fairly assumed that Soviet unwillingness to deliver atomic weapons to Chinese control had become a serious issue. It is now known that the Soviets cited as the reason for their reluctance their apprehension over Chinese policies in the external field which were in conflict with Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" tactics, affirmed that global or limited war need not be avoided, and objected to Khrushchev's aid programs for "bourgeois" regimes in underdeveloped countries on the grounds that they would delay revolution. Chinese objections to peaceful coexistence tactics manifested themselves ~~from~~ ^{and pronouncements} about 1957 on in the deliberations of the International Communist Front organizations, especially within the World Peace Council and the International Union of Students--two organizations which were most directly and intensely engaged in building their appeal on the unity campaign so typical of the peaceful coexistence period. ^T They desired to involve bourgeois and nationalist

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groups in mass action and therefore advocated informal conversations, ~~and~~
negotiations ~~with them~~, and ~~to make~~ concessions to such groups.

The Chinese refused to "sit around the table" with them except in formal meetings ~~with~~ ^{of} designated representatives, and ~~refused~~ ^{resisted Soviet efforts} to broaden the scope of concessions on program and organization questions. Chinese ~~resistance~~ ^{opposition} was particularly manifest after the Soviet decision of June 1959 concerning Khrushchev's visit to the United States.

3. In August 1959, the Chinese overran the Indian border post at Longju and reopened the border dispute with India, after eight years of quiet. The Soviet position on this dispute significantly failed to give full endorsement to the Chinese claims, although ~~preceding~~ ^{earlier} Chinese repressive actions in Tibet had been promptly supported as just and as an "internal affair." Khrushchev, as was known later, did not interpret the reopening of the dispute as a mere attempt to register opposition to his trip to the United States, but as an un-Marxist blunder which needlessly undermined Indian neutralist attitudes and potential value in the peace and disarmament campaign and impaired the appeal of CP India. When Khrushchev visited Peiping, after his trip to the United States, for the October anniversary celebrations in 1959, the Sino-Indian dispute was one topic of discussion and it is virtually certain that Khrushchev presented his views on improving USSR-U.S. relations. Sino-Soviet discussions were, however, unsatisfactory and no communique was published. According to three widely separated and reliable sources, in October 1959 the CPSU sent a letter to at least the bloc parties, holding fast to Khrushchev's views on USSR-U.S. relations. In November 1959,

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V. Ilyich, *Chief of the Agitation Department* of CPSU, published an article in Problems of Peace and Socialism that justified the policy of peaceful coexistence as "class struggle on the international plane" and significantly noted Lenin's criticism of "Left Communists." It is known that the Chinese have since been accused of criticizing the November 1959 joint program of the European parties, which is clearly based upon the same premises as the article. In December 1959, Khrushchev warned the Chinese in stating at the Hungarian Party Congress that "we must all synchronize our watches."

4. In January 1960, the Chinese positions hardened. ^{the} At/Rome meeting of the Presidential Committee of the World Peace Council in January 1960 it transpired that the Chinese had charged the USSR with seeking to isolate China in the interest of achieving a modus vivendi with the U. S. A reliable source states that the USSR in January 1960 informally broached *to the Chinese* the idea that the Sino-Soviet differences required discussion, only to be told by the Chinese that the differences were between the parties and should not be mentioned. The CPC appears to have reached important decisions during January ^{which} had a major effect on the dispute. On 21 January the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress adopted a resolution concerning disarmament which specified that China would only be bound by treaties it takes part in framing; and in February 1960, at the meeting of the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries, the Chinese observer, K'ang Sheng, incorporated the statement in his speech, broadening it to include "all international agreements." The contrast between the descriptions of the world situation in K'ang Sheng's speech and those given by the European bloc speakers was striking.

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5. It is at this point that the 1957 Moscow declaration first began to be quoted to support the conflicting positions, when the People's Daily of 6 February 1960 asserted that "the development of the international situation has borne out the correctness of the declaration." It appears likely, therefore, that the Chinese decided in late January to take the initiative in broadening the debate. But also on 6 February a verbal message from the Central Committee of the CPSU was reportedly delivered in Peiping, asking the CPC to attend a meeting to discuss outstanding problems.

6. In mid-April 1960 the Chinese took advantage of the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birth to make their most serious public attack on the theoretical innovations developed by the CPSU at and after the XXth Party Congress in January 1956. Using oblique but unmistakable arguments, the Chinese challenged the premises underlying Soviet foreign policy and by implication disparaged Khrushchev's stature as a Communist theorist. The Chinese attack comprised three major statements: two articles in the party's theoretical monthly Red Flag (issues no. 7 and 8, 1 and 16 April), the first entitled "On Imperialism as the Source of War in Modern Times" and the second entitled "Long Live Leninism," ^{as well as} and an editorial on 22 April in the authoritative newspaper, the People's Daily.

7. The Soviets replied in the speech delivered in Moscow on 22 April by Otto Kuusinen of the CPSU Central Committee and Secretariat. A very strong defense of current Soviet foreign policy and of the general lines endorsed at the XXth and XXIth CPSU Congresses, his speech confined its critical comments to general statements condemning "dogmatic positions

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as backward positions." On the same day a Chinese Politburo alternate, Lu Ting-i, gave a speech in Peiping which incorporated many of the arguments of the "Long Live Leninism" article. The divergences between the two speeches were so great that when one Communist party seriously affected by the dispute, the Indian party, published both speeches side by side in the 8 May issue of its newspaper New Age, without comments, its action aroused considerable comment and created confusion among party members.

8. The Chinese then began to carry their case to the other parties. "Long Live Leninism," the Lu Ting-i speech, and the People's Daily editorial of 22 April were translated and published in the widely circulated English language Peking Review of 26 April. At the same time, the first edition of a book containing the three articles was produced by the Foreign Languages Press in Peiping in many languages for distribution abroad. Two further editions of this book were produced, one in May and the other, after the Bucharest confrontations, in August. The book is known to exist in English, Spanish, French, the Eastern European languages (including Russian), and Vietnamese. It has been distributed in India and in certain countries at least of Latin America and Western Europe. It appears that the Chinese later attempted to circulate the articles in the USSR in one of their two Russian language publications, Druzhba, an action which the Soviets protested. The magazine was in fact suspended from circulation in the USSR after the publication of the June issue. Earlier instances of Soviet refusals to circulate Chinese doctrinal writings in the USSR have recently been reported by reliable sources, who heard the details during party discussions of the Sino-Soviet differences.

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9. After the Kuusinen rebuttal of Chinese charges, the CPSU took advantage of the 40th anniversary of the publication of Lenin's book Leftwing Communism, an Infantile Disorder (10 June 1960) to carry the public ideological debate with the Chinese to new heights, including the use of the charge of "deviation." Two Soviet articles published on 10 June, one by D. Shevlyagin in the newspaper Soviet Russia and one by N. Matkovsky in the party newspaper Pravda, expressed this criticism by attacking "contemporary left-wing deviationism" in terms which referred to the positions held by the Chinese party. Both articles highlighted the significance of the 12 Party Declaration of November 1957. Matkovsky characterized it as a "programmatic document of the international Communist movement," and as a validation of the general line expressed by the CPSU. Shevlyagin, on the other hand, referred particularly to the declaration as authorizing and requiring a struggle against "leftist opportunism" as well as against "rightist opportunism" such as that of the Yugoslavs. In discussing manifestations of left opportunism he made the significant point that "not only groups of Communists but the leadership of individual parties have veered into leftist deviationism." Neither of the articles explicitly identified the Chinese as the target of criticism, but their relevance to the dispute was unmistakable.

10. The timing of this intensification of the Soviet attack on the Chinese views coincides with a CPSU letter on the Summit Conference which was circulated, shortly after Khrushchev's return home following the collapse of the conference, to the Communist parties of the bloc and those of France and Italy. Although the text of this letter is not available, it seems likely

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to have been unacceptable to the Chinese, who emphasized from mid-May on that the course of events before and at Paris proved the validity of the Chinese arguments concerning imperialism and the illusory and fruitless character of negotiation. Perhaps the worst offense of the Chinese, in Soviet eyes, was their argument that the only value of Communist participation in such peace negotiations was the purely tactical advantage that came out of their eventual exposure of the true character and intentions of the enemy. This observation was precisely the kind of statement which the CPSU was most eager to avert.

11. It is likely too that the CPSU decided at this time to send a sharp letter of criticism to the CPC. One prominent Free World Communist who visited Moscow in late May stated that he learned from a member of the CPSU Secretariat that a "sharp" letter was being sent to the CPC. ~~the~~ CPSU letters calling for a conference was reportedly sent to the Chinese on 7 June, and ^{2 June and on} it appears likely that the letter of 2 June was the "sharp" one. ¹ It is also worth noting that the CPC leaders went into closed conference in Shanghai on 8 June, a move which may well have been prompted by the receipt of the CPSU letters. ^{two} They were in fact still meeting when the Chinese delegation left for the Bucharest party congress.

12. The Chinese too made a major move in the now rapidly developing dispute. They did this in early June at the XIth General Council meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Peiping. On 2 June they presented an ultimatum on the official WFTU report to the chief Soviet representative, who rejected it. The Chinese claimed that the report contained ^{objectionable} ~~unreasonable~~ features, including

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attacks on the communes. At this meeting, which opened on 5 June after a five-day delay, in the presence of both WFTU affiliates and representatives of some twenty-five unaffiliated national trade union federations, the leading Chinese figures Chou En-lai, Liu Shao-ch'i, Liu Ning-i, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and Liu Chang-sheng publicized the Chinese views on the peace struggle, the threat of imperialism, and the "illusions" aroused by the campaigns for peaceful coexistence and by programs for giving substantial economic aid to bourgeois-led underdeveloped countries. Using a tactic they had employed earlier in April, the Chinese leaders accompanied these criticisms with fulsome expressions of approval of the Soviet posture towards the U.S. at the time of the collapse of the Summit Conference. This approval of the Soviet actions was accompanied by expressions of solidarity with the USSR in its stand against U.S. acts of aggression. It was learned that the CPSU was particularly stung by the speeches of Liu Ning-i and Liu Chang-sheng.

13. When the Chinese convened a private meeting of Communist party members among the delegates to hear a statement of the Chinese criticisms of CPSU doctrines, representatives of the CPSU promptly opposed the continuation of the talks and made the ominous charge that the Chinese action was a violation of the terms of the 12 Party Declaration of November 1957. This Soviet appeal to the authority of the Moscow declaration paralleled the similar appeal in the Shevlyagin article published in Moscow, and the charge has since figured prominently in the CPSU's presentation of its case. According to credible reports, during the WFTU session Teng Hsiao-p'ing, general secretary of the CPC, accused the CPSU in turn of "throwing the Moscow declaration overboard."

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representatives in Peiping not only criticized the Chinese actions in personal discussions with foreign Communist representatives, but by 9 June took concrete steps to enlist the support of other CP's against the Chinese. The representative of one Free World CP was told, by a representative of the Soviet All Union Central Council of Trade Unions, that the Soviet embassy in Peiping was interested in knowing if he could stop over in Moscow after the end of the conference.

15. When a group of European and African delegates to the WFTU meeting arrived in Moscow on 13 June, a number of CPSU officials conferred with members of this group. One of the delegates in the group is known to have talked privately with a top official, V. Tereshkin, of the CPSU Foreign Section, concerning the Sino-Soviet dispute. The delegate was informed of the interpretation the CPSU placed on recent Chinese actions, and Tereshkin asked that he have a plenum of his party's central committee convened after his return home to discuss the Chinese actions at Peiping and to condemn them as violations of the Moscow declaration. A second person, tentatively identified as L. I. Brezhnev, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, was also reported present at this meeting. According to a statement broadcast while the Bucharest congress was in session, representatives of the French and Spanish Communist parties held a meeting on 14 and 15 June, at which they reaffirmed their adherence to the 12 Party Declaration. ^{Because} ~~Since~~ the leadership of both ~~of~~ these parties was represented in the group of WFTU delegates in Moscow at this time, it appears possible that the meeting in question took

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place there and that the reaffirmation was a reaction to the Peiping events.

16. In contrast to these cryptic endorsements of the Moscow declaration, on 19 June 1960 a statement by Agostino Novella, a leading Italian Communist and president of the WFTU, was published in the Italian Party newspaper Unita. In this statement, which was also broadcast in Italian from Czechoslovakia on 20 June, Novella described the Chinese criticism of the resolutions proposed at the WFTU Council meeting in Peiping and, like the 10 June Soviet articles, characterized the Chinese views as "deviations." So far as can be determined, this was the first instance in which a Free World Communist party publicized this charge against the Chinese. The appearance of the statement coincided with the opening of the 3rd Congress of the Rumanian Workers Party in Bucharest, where the next phase of the dispute developed.

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The Bucharest debates (20-27 June 1960)

17. The Chinese determination to press at Bucharest for Soviet adoption of a militant line is suggested by an article in the 16 June issue of Red Flag, which, in an obvious reference to the CPSU's earlier justification of its views on peace and peaceful coexistence, observed that "one cannot separate oneself from the revisionists merely by stating that the forces of socialism predominate over the forces of imperialism."

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The Chinese delegation to the congress of the Rumanian Workers Party stopped in Moscow for an exchange of views on 17 June. It presented a letter from the CPC which limited its powers to ~~the~~ agreeing on a date for a party conference to discuss Sino-Soviet differences and ~~the~~ exchanging views, without, however, adopting any formal resolution. The CPSU representatives were not successful in obtaining an admission from the Chinese delegation of the errors of the CPC. The Chinese, however, reportedly expressed a willingness to correct their positions if in an exchange of views with the delegates at Bucharest a majority should prove them wrong. The CPSU, justifying its action by invoking the November 1957 Peace Manifesto (not the 12 Party Declaration adopted at the same time), insisted that the views of all the Communist parties should eventually be ascertained before attempting a meeting to reach a final solution. In this context, the Bucharest session should presumably have involved nothing but an exchange of views. The Chinese stated at Bucharest that in Moscow the CPSU had first made the proposal that other parties be brought into the debate, but had wished to confine the group to delegates from the bloc parties only. The Chinese said that they had rejected this proposal. It would appear, then, that the Chinese adherence to their instruction forced the Soviet's hand.

18. ~~While~~ ^{Although} there are reports that the CPSU intended by the end of May to attack the Chinese at Bucharest, the Soviet decision to make a major effort there to enlist the support of other parties appears to have been

reached as a result of the Chinese stand on 17 June. Virtually none of the major Free World parties sent top-level delegates to the congress. The fact that Khrushchev was to lead the Soviet delegation was announced only on June 18, the day of his departure. All the European satellite delegations except Albania were led by persons of national stature equal to that of Khrushchev, but the late arrival of Gomulka of Poland and the early departure of Novotny of Czechoslovakia suggest that this top-level representation was organized on short notice. The leader of the Chinese delegation, P'eng Chen, was clearly outranked by this group. Fifty parties were represented at the congress. Twenty-five of the thirty-five non-bloc fraternal delegations identified as present were composed of second and third echelon party leaders and none of the more significant Free World parties, except Chile and Syria, were represented by their leaders.

19. The Soviet delegation to Bucharest included B. Ponomarev and Y. A. Andropov, the heads of the two Central Committee sections for relations with the non-bloc parties, respectively. During the first days of the congress they and their colleagues concentrated on briefing fraternal delegates. It is known that a group of English-speaking delegates and a second group comprising those who spoke Spanish were called together separately and briefed from a long letter which the CPSU intended to issue to all parties. The letter had apparently been either completed or revised at the last moment, for it contained the Soviet account of the Moscow exchanges of 17 June and explained the Soviet view of how the inter-party discussion should be handled. The inclusion of Wu Hsiu-ch'uan, the deputy director of the CPC's International Liaison Department, as one of the four Chinese delegates suggests that the Chinese too planned to exploit their supporters and acquaintances among the delegates.

20. The reporting on the sequence of events at Bucharest concerning

the Sino-Soviet dispute is in some respects contradictory. The following probable chronology, however, emerges from an analysis of the available information.

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a. On 21 June the Rumanian party congress began its open sessions. N. S. Khrushchev, in his first public speech to the congress, presented the essentials of the Soviet line and criticized "mechanical repeaters of what Lenin said on imperialism," called such persons "children", and attacked "those who do not understand that war is, under present circumstances, not inevitable." Other public speeches by Rumanians and fraternal delegates, including the Chinese, P'eng Chen, occupied most of the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd.

NCNA
b. On 22 June P'eng Chen spoke publicly in the morning. He included in his remarks a characterization of recent U.S. actions as a "peace fraud," and he warned that "imperialism can never be trusted." Referring on a number of points to the 12 Party Declaration, he emphasized the doctrinal statements previously highlighted in the Chinese criticisms of the Soviet line. He praised the Cuban and Algerian struggles and said that war could be averted and peace preserved by aiding liberation movements and revolutionary struggles. He also called for Communist unity and the "broadest possible anti-imperialist united front with the unity at its core." He further charged, as his party had done earlier, that the imperialists were using modern revisionists (Tito) to disrupt Communist unity, and he called for a struggle to the end against modern revisionism. He made no mention of "peaceful coexistence," an omission for which he was later upbraided by Mr. Khrushchev. It was on this day that the CPSU ^{reportedly} began caucusing with the fraternal delegates.

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21. Three inter-party meetings dealing with the Sino-Soviet dispute appear to have been held. The first occurred on 24 June, when the Soviet

bloc representatives met all day to draft a communique. No information is available on this meeting beyond a statement that the first draft of the communique was presented by the Soviet representative and that the Chinese felt obliged to refer the final draft to the Central Committee in Peiping for possible amendment. The move to produce a communique appears, in light of the CPC instructions to its delegation, to have been a surprise pressure move by the CPSU. The Chinese delegates were

obviously faced with a dilemma, ^{succumbing to pressure,} ~~but~~ they did sign the communique on the 24th.

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22. On 25 June, after the conclusion of the congress at mid-day, a closed meeting of approximately 140 delegates from 50 parties was convened. This second meeting, a full-scale debate, was opened by the first secretary of the Rumanian party, Georghiu-Dej, who read the draft communique. A number of other delegates then spoke, including, at least, representatives of East Germany, the UK, France, and Italy. In fact, according to one source, more than twenty delegates spoke before

the Chinese representatives took the floor. The Soviet caucusing and briefings had had some effect, for most of the speakers are reported to have adhered in general to the Soviet line of argument. It is also worth noting that Pospelov, the Soviet representative at this meeting, reportedly did not speak. This tactic--in which others take the lead in a Soviet-inspired attack--is well known and is usually employed to permit the CPSU

to have the last word and to appear as an objective mediator rather than merely as one more partisan participant in a debate. When the Chinese representative finally spoke, he attacked the line taken by most of the preceding speakers, charging that it was unrealistic, slanderous, and groundless, and based upon incomplete evidence. He also criticized negative attitudes toward certain Chinese domestic policies and asserted that the reports prepared for the WFTU Peiping meeting had contained attacks against the communes and great-leap forward programs. (See note.)

He refuted charges that the Chinese had not played their full part in the peace struggle, referring to their support of Khrushchev's visit to the U.S. and to Chou En-lai's negotiations with many countries. He also insisted that the Chinese had supported peaceful coexistence, noting in particular their role in the 1955 Bandung conference. According to another source, the Chinese representative also stated that China would stand on the Moscow declaration of 1957, supported the idea that a re-appraisal of the international situation was necessary, and endorsed a proposal that the reappraisal should be carried out on a multiparty basis.

This Chinese reaction appears to have been mainly defensive ; what new facts the Chinese delegate brought forward were apparently selected to prove that the Soviet case was a biased and and incomplete presentation.

Pospelov too endorsed this proposal.

(Note. This Chinese charge is particularly interesting ^{because} ~~since~~ the two main WFTU reports presented at Peiping, by Marcel Bras and Ibrahim Zakaria, did not criticize these Chinese policies. In fact, the Bras report contained two laudatory references to the communes. It is known, however, that on 2 June (i.e., three days before the delayed opening of the Peiping meeting) the Chinese informed V. Grishin, the head of the Soviet delegation, that the treatment of the peace and disarmament themes in the draft WFTU reports was unacceptable and would be openly attacked if the drafts were not amended before presentation. It is also known that these sections were not amended to meet Chinese demands--in fact, a number of amendments actually made in the final report strengthened the WFTU's support for the Soviet ~~peace~~ ^{as} line. At least one amendment, dealing with the question of Free World economic trade and aid with under-developed countries, was, in fact, of such a nature ^{as} to be particularly unpalatable to the Chinese. It has also been reported that the French representatives at ^{Bucharest} ~~Budapest~~ were particularly incensed with the Chinese for having brought this question into the debate, but no one is reported to have refuted the Chinese charge as untrue. One report provides a

clue to a plausible explanation of this matter by noting that the Chinese said that "such a WFTU report would have been rejected by the Chinese people".² It seems likely then that the Chinese charges referred to the original draft of the WFTU report prepared by Louis Saillant, ~~which probably did contain such an attack~~ ^{which probably did contain such an attack}. It probably was edited out, at Bras ^(The official language) Soviet insistence, before/actually delivered the report to the council.

The involvement of the two Frenchmen, Saillant and Bras, in this matter would explain the vigorous reaction of the French delegates at Bucharest.)

25X1A6c 23. Delegates at this second meeting received a number of papers, including an ~~80~~ ^{80-plus} page Chinese translation of a CPSU document. This ~~84-page~~ document appears to be a critical factor in the further development of the dispute. Its existence has been reported by a number of

25X1A6c independent and widely separated sources, and at least two reports indicate that it was a sharp, wide ranging, and bitterly critical summary of Soviet criticisms of the CPC. One source has reported that, prior to the Bucharest congress, the CPSU addressed a "~~sharp~~ ^{sharp}" letter to the CPC embodying its criticisms of Chinese doctrines and actions, including charges against the Chinese foreign policy toward India and Algeria, as well as charges that Chinese actions were destroying

25X1A6c "bourgeois" confidence in Communist desires for peace and arousing Afro-Asian suspicions of international Communism. The fact that the CPSU sent a letter "raising various issues" to the CPC was also stated by P'eng Chen at Bucharest. A third source, describing the contents of the ~~84-page~~ document, also notes its sharp tone and its charges of Chinese errors in the foreign policy toward India. In addition, this source says that it criticized Chinese nationalism ^{and} Chinese non-cooperation with the USSR in military matters. On the basis of this series of reports it seems probable that the ~~84-page~~ Chinese-translated Soviet document

distributed at this second meeting on 25 June was in fact the full text of the ^{sharp} "strong" CPSU letter to the CPC. ^(see above, para 11) If this was the case, its presentation by the Chinese was clearly a part of their effort to set the record straight, and undoubtedly disrupted the Soviet tactical plans for the meeting. Such a significant decision must necessarily have been made by the CPC Central Committee, probably during its early June meeting, and suggests that the CPC's attitude toward the Bucharest meeting was predicated, at least to some extent, on the use of this tactic. There is some question whether Khrushchev was present at this first day of debate. At least one source indicates that he was present, but there is no evidence that he participated in the discussion.

24. On 26 June came the final meeting, another closed session that was attended by those present on the preceding day. It was at this second installment of the debate the Khrushchev personally presented his general indictment of the Chinese and provoked a heated exchange with P'eng Chen. A number of reports state that the Khrushchev speech opened the proceedings. The speech was a long one and reportedly involved direct attacks on Mao Tse-tung, comparing him to Stalin as "always thinking in his own terms" and "formulating theories without coming into contact with the events of the modern world." One source states that Khrushchev's speech was arranged at short notice. The reporting on the speech suggests that it was at least partly extemporaneous, with Khrushchev injecting facts, anecdotes, and direct charges that effectively demolished the attitude of restraint, tact, and adherence to principle which the CPSU had previously tried to maintain in the debate. Speaking angrily, with violent gestures, he described the CPC doctrines as ultra-leftist, as dogmatic, and, finally, as left revisionist. He said the Chinese did not understand the nature of modern war, and rejected Chinese protests over the fact that the USSR had failed to support China in her border dispute with India, characterizing the dispute as a conflict

of purely national interests in which the interests of world Communism were not involved. There is reason to suspect that his attack also included charges directed against some elements of other Communist parties of complicity with the Chinese. He attacked P'eng Chen himself, chiding him for his failure to refer to peaceful coexistence in his public address to the congress on the 22nd. In general he apparently reiterated in stronger and less ambiguous terms virtually all the charges embodied in the original CPSU letter to the CPC. Since his speech is described by some sources as a systematic and detailed presentation of the Soviet charges, it seems likely that it was in fact built around the argumentation of the draft circular letter ^{of 21 June} earlier shown to Free World delegates.

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25. P'eng Chen is reported to have replied in very heated terms.



He said he had asked for a discussion to be held on equal terms, and that the CPC respected the CPSU as an "elder brother" but not as a "father" party. Counter-attacking strongly, he accused Khrushchev of organizing the meeting to make an attack on the CPC and Mao Tse-tung and to cover up a Soviet effort to undermine the prestige of the CPC. He defended Mao as "more in contact with the modern world than Khrushchev, and more active than ever since leaving the government chairmanship."

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Referring to Khrushchev himself in terms reminiscent of the 16 June Red Flag article, he charged that "Khrushchev's policy ~~to wait and see~~ is a policy of revisionism, creating illusions about imperialism and underestimating its true nature." Speaking of the abrupt shifts in Khrushchev's policy toward the imperialist powers, he reportedly asked the delegates whether "any conclusions can be drawn regarding Khrushchev's policy toward the imperialist powers." He stated finally that the CPC had no trust in Khrushchev's analysis of the world situation and especially his policy toward the imperialists. Refuting Khrushchev's charges that the Chinese did not understand modern war, P'eng said the Chinese had proved in Korea as well as against the Japanese that they have more experience

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 than other peoples of the world. He further registered a protest, saying that he had asked for delay in the issuance of the communique but had been told ~~on 24 June~~ that it had to be signed in the interest of unity. He stated for the benefit of other delegates the instructions under which he was working, and said that if the communique were published without the approval of the CPC's Central Committee corrections might later be required.

26. A number of statements by others were ~~than~~² made in a general discussion. Todor Zhivkov first spoke and gave full support to Khrushchev's position; others, while less warm than Zhivkov, were, it is reported, generally pro-Khrushchev in their views. No one spoke against the Soviet position. Khrushchev reportedly ended the session by saying that further bilateral discussions between the CPSU and the CPC were necessary.

27. A commission (or committee) was set up at these sessions to prepare for a conference to be held during the next November anniversary celebrations in Moscow, where all parties were to present their views. Divergent reports on the composition of the committee have been received. In general they agree that the committee was to involve about twenty parties and that all the bloc parties were to be represented. At least two separate reports state that the parties of Argentina, Cuba, Brazil, Japan, and West Germany were also to be represented on the commission. One of these reports, supported by a third separate one, also states that Italy and France were to participate. Other parties to participate, listed only in single reports, are those of the U.S., the U.K., India, Syria, and Australia. At least one source states that the commission was to be composed only of representatives of the bloc parties. The terms of

reference of this commission are not known. ^{The Commission has since been} ~~It is probable, however, that~~ ^{called to meet in} Moscow at the end of September. A separate CPSU committee has allegedly been set up as the Soviet supporters on it are likely to favor concentration on a critical ^{well, to} examination of the CP's views and of their effect on the movement rather

~~than on the reassessment of the international situation endorsed by the CPC.~~

17/prepare a new CPSU document on the dispute, ^{in November}
 It seems probable that the CPSU is planning to use this as the draft letter of 21 June was used at Bucharest, to predetermine the outcome of the conference

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According to one source, Khrushchev gave instructions to the delegates at the end of the session that they were to report back to their Central Committees that a plenum should be convened to discuss the doctrinal dispute, with the results of these plenums to be disseminated at all levels of the party. On the basis of other information, however, it appears probable that most parties did not construe his statement as a command, for there were few such programs initiated before the CPSU's plenum of mid-July.

28. The final communique approved by the fraternal delegates was, ^{it was} ~~was~~ released by TASS in Moscow on 27 June. According to one source, ^{it was} adopted primarily to conceal the fact that the meeting had failed to accomplish anything, but the CPSU, particularly Khrushchev, clearly wanted it as a device to exert pressure for prompt resolution of the dispute. A short and virtually mechanical reaffirmation of the validity of the 12 Party Declaration of November 1957, its text did not in fact clarify any of the issues in the dispute. This became apparent in a few days with the appearance of the Soviet and Chinese ^(including the CPC) press statements on the communique. The ^{signatures of the 12 bloc parties, registered on 24 June, as} unanimous approval given by the fifty parties represented ^{were} ~~was~~ to prove the only significant feature of the communique.

29. The principal results of the Bucharest meetings appear to be the following. The Chinese succeeded in making known to a large audience of bloc and non-bloc Communist party delegates their strong exceptions to Khrushchev's policies and some of the less "principled" actions taken against them by the CPSU. They may have hoped that their adamant tactics would create fear of an open split and thus force the Soviets to break down or compromise. Their actions ~~and those of Khrushchev himself~~ left the Soviets and their supporters in other parties little choice but to defend the Soviet position as the supreme authority and policy maker in the international Communist movement and to apply against the Chinese all their influence within the bloc and Free World Communist parties. It would

appear that the final Chinese position was one from which they will have to retreat if they desire a settlement. It is premised that this will be the situation with which the Soviets will attempt to confront them in November 1960, when the world Communist leadership meets in Moscow on the occasion of the celebration of the October Revolution.

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The CPSU Document of 21 June 1960

FBI Summary
July - 8
 30. The CPSU circular of 21 June consisted of seventy ^{some} ~~pages~~ pages.

In an introductory section it outlined the history of the dispute in "recent" * years. In succeeding sections it analyzed and refuted the Chinese arguments and it presented a bill of particulars on instances of Chinese violation of discipline.

31. Soviet views on the background of the dispute. The document stated that, despite a long history of friendly relations and cooperation between the USSR and the CPR, the Soviets noted that the Chinese had "recently" begun to take divergent positions on very important questions and that this ^{stand} threatened to disrupt good relations and the solidarity of the international movement. This ^{divergence} was manifested in the Chinese articles ^{the anniversary of} on Lenin's birth ~~anniversary~~ in April, statements within the WFTU and other international organizations, and Chinese statements ^{at variance with} ~~diverging from~~ the 1957 Moscow Declaration and Peace Manifesto. The CPSU ^{had} made no move against these Chinese statements, considering it necessary to hold a meeting to discuss them.

32. According to the Soviets, Chou En-lai told the Soviet Ambassador to China in January that the problem was essentially a Party matter and that he preferred not to discuss it.

* Excerpts set off in quotation marks in this account are based on a number of summaries of this document, and do not necessarily reflect the exact text.

33. On 6 February 1960, the Central Committee of the CPSU proposed a discussion to resolve the differences. The Chinese refused to attend such a meeting and began publicizing their views.

34. At the time of the meeting of the General Council of the WFTU in Peking in early June, the Chinese revealed to the Soviets their great dissatisfaction with CPSU positions and they also told other Communists of their attitude. On 2 June Liu Ning-yi told Grishin that the Chinese were very ^s dissatisfied with the position of the WFTU on the question of peace and disarmament. Liu Ning-yi said that "to sit down at the same table with imperialists" meant the "betrayal of all mankind". He warned Grishin that if the report of the WFTU were not changed, the Chinese would criticize the WFTU and expose its "right opportunism."

35. At a session of the General Council, Liu Ning-yi presented views that differed from the Soviet positions, the CPSU document charged. Then, at a supper and meeting to which the Chinese Politburo invited some delegates, Liu Shao-chi said that there were important differences of opinion among the Communist Parties. Teng Hsiao-p'ing then spoke on "War and Peace", accusing the Soviets of errors in the 20th Congress thesis on "peaceful coexistence" and of ^{if} throwing overboard the Moscow Declaration-- at the same time, according to the CPSU document, as he himself contradicted the Moscow Declaration. He attacked Soviet efforts to negotiate with the

West as a "betrayal" of world Communism. Chou En-lai was going to speak, but the delegates asserted that they would not condone criticism or discussions "behind the backs" of the Communist Parties.

26. The CPSU document criticized the Chinese methods as incorrect, unacceptable and ~~opposed to~~ ^{opposed to} proletarian internationalism. The Soviets had been informed by comrades of other Parties that the Chinese had many times asked for meetings and had been making known criticisms and disagreements going back to as early as 1956.

27. The Chinese said that because of the opposition expressed against their attitude, they would not speak in the WFTU sessions; but they nevertheless did so, even in discussion with non-Communist delegates. The ^W the Chinese speakers at the WFTU meeting tried to impose the Chinese line on the WFTU and openly to line the WFTU up against the CPSU.

28. In addition, the Soviet document charged, the Chinese were distributing "Long Live Leninism" and other critical articles within the Bloc, without the permission of the other CPs.

29. It is necessary to discuss the problems of the "character of the present epoch", "war and peace", "coexistence", and "road to socialism", the CPSU document states, because the "Communist movement does not see these problems clearly."

44. "Character of the present epoch." The document criticized as one-sided the Chinese characterization of the epoch as one of "imperialism, wars, and revolutions." The Chinese claim that any other attitude is a departure from Lenin's views. The CPSU believes that the Chinese fail to take into account the changes in the correlation of class forces and that they misunderstand and misinterpret Lenin's thesis. The Chinese analysis is "incomplete" and ~~that~~ it conflicts with the Soviet characterization of the "epoch" as one also of "disintegration of imperialism, transition to socialism, and of formation and consolidation of the world system of socialism." Developing further the well-established Soviet concepts in this regard, the document stated that the definition of the character of the epoch has "great fundamental importance", for from this definition are derived different conclusions regarding "strategy and tactics, peaceful transition, peaceful coexistence, war, peace, and disarmament."

44. ^{The} Chinese claims/ that the CPSU has departed from Leninism in appraising the nature of "imperialism", but ^{they are} ~~the~~ wrong. The document cited statements at the 20th and 21st Congress and by Khrushchev on his return from the U.S. and later, from France, to support the Soviet refutation of the Chinese charges.

41. War and Peace. At one time, the CPSU document said, the Chinese adhered to the Khrushchev thesis on peaceful coexistence. Lately, in the April articles and at the WFTU meeting, the Chinese have departed from this thesis. In Red Flag the Chinese said that only the "imperialist general staff", and not the Communists, could decide whether there would be war or peace, whether to launch local or general war, or whether to intervene abroad. This attitude is based on a wrong analysis of forces. The document reiterated the Soviet argument that "war is not merely an economic phenomenon", but depends upon the correlation of forces, and that the forces of peace may be able to prevent the "imperialists" from resorting to war. The most "decisive" factor is the Communist camp.

43. To take the position that war is inevitable leads to "fatalism", "paralyzes the struggle", and "disarms the people." Events after the 20th Congress confirm the Soviet thesis. By 1965 "even the most rash imperialists will see ^{that} war is impossible."

44. At the Moscow conference in 1957 Mao himself said that ' " ' Everything reduces itself to gaining fifteen years. Lasting peace will be assured throughout the world. ' " Today, the Chinese are inconsistent. On the one hand, they call imperialism a "paper tiger". On the other hand, they say that the imperialists cannot be restrained. ^{The CPSU,} ~~we~~, however,

say that the imperialists should neither be over or underestimated.

45. According to Chinese articles, whoever defends the thesis

[of averting war] is " 'opposed to wars of liberation' ". This is false.

Coexistence "does not mean renunciation of proletarian class war, or of national liberation, including armed struggle." The contrary is true: class struggle will increase once the threat of war has been eliminated.

46. The Chinese have persisted in their view that "as long as imperialism exists...^{the} succession of periods of war and peace will be permanent and inevitable." (The document cited Red Flag and Peoples Daily.) At the WFTU meeting, Liu Chang-sheng said that it was an "illusion" to think that there could be a world without wars and without arms so long as imperialism exists. At a public session of the WFTU, members of the Chinese Central Committee launched a polemic against the ~~Peace~~ ^{manifesto} declaration which had been signed by "all" Parties, including the Chinese.

47. The CPSU document declared that peaceful coexistence means "gaining time" for the "consolidation of the Socialist system and the acceleration of the building of socialism and Communism." The "Communist Parties cannot permit society to be thrown back hundreds of years" and the destruction of "hundreds of millions" of people.

48. It is impossible to accept the arguments of Red Flag: " ' We need

not fear war. Atom bombs are paper tigers [used by the imperialists] to subjugate people. The losses from war will be compensated by the victory of socialism.)"

49. The Soviet position, the CPSU document says, is that ten or fifteen years of peace will assure the supremacy of Socialism and it will then be possible to exclude war, "even if capitalism remains in part of the world." (The document cites Lenin in support of this policy.)

50. Coexistence, the Soviets assert, will encourage centrifugal forces within the "imperialist bloc" and will "sharpen contradictions" within "imperialist countries" and between them.

51. The Chinese say that coexistence means "class peace". This is wrong. The Soviets never included within the concept of coexistence relations between colonies and colonialist countries, between dependent and imperialist countries, or between the proletariat and the exploiters. Coexistence, on the contrary, is a "form of class war" on the international level. It opens up possibilities for solidarity with the masses for the eventual defeat of capitalism. (The document cites the November 1959 Rome "Appeal" of the 17 West European CPs.)

52. The Chinese say that, in connection with the struggle for national liberation, "the CPSU is flirting with the national bourgeoisie" and "abandoning class positions." This is wrong. The Soviet position on participation of the

national bourgeoisie in the national liberation struggle is "Leninist".

33. Soviet economic aid to the "liberated countries" is justified by

the fact that "objectively" ^{such aid} ~~they~~ promote the cause of peace and weaken

imperialism. The Chinese say that the policy should be "revised" on the

ground that when the national bourgeoisie gains power it loses its ability

to fight imperialism [India, Egypt, and Indonesia were cited] and "are

themselves becoming imperialists."

34. The Soviets answer ^{this} by saying that it is necessary not to "skip

stages in the revolution". To do so can cause "serious damage." It is

essential to "look at the correlation of class forces." The "imperialists"

try to exploit "splits in the national liberation movements". The Communists

must try to increase their "friends" among the neutralists. This used to be

the policy of the Chinese, with their slogan of "unity and struggle", but no

longer.

35. The CPSU document said that it was necessary to exploit "contradictions

in the enemy camp" and cited Lenin's statements on this subject. The Chinese

argument that one should "not sit at the table with the imperialists" is a

denial of this Leninist policy.

36. The Soviets consider it essential not to minimize the military strength

of the "imperialists" because to do so would make it impossible to "mobilize

the masses against the threat of war."

57. The document denied that coexistence weakens the military ability of the "Socialist camp", and refuted Chinese insinuations at the WFTU meeting that disarmament proposals encouraged "illusions". The current Soviet approach to disarmament is "new". It is based on the belief that the Soviet policy would make it possible to create "broad popular fronts" and mass movements, and that it makes it difficult for "bellicose circles to intensify the arms race." The Soviet effort to get rid of U.S. overseas bases is a major aim of the disarmament campaign, and events in Japan have shown the effectiveness of Soviet policy. The Chinese are wrong to oppose the disarmament slogan and this opposition is in conflict with Soviet program. The Chinese concept of a "third way" which was put forward at the WFTU meeting means nothing less than continuation of the cold war, and of the arms race, and ^{crises} political difficulties for the peace policies of the USSR by substantiating imperialist charges that Communists want war.

58. Different Forms of Transition to Socialism. The CPSU document refuted the Chinese charge that the CPSU had been advocating the idea that the "peaceful way" was the "only way of transition." It cited ^{the} ~~that~~ 20th Congress thesis on this point and the statement in the 1957 Moscow Declaration. The Chinese, the document said, had apparently departed from their previous agreement with the CPSU, and if they no longer agreed, they should say so.

59. Chinese activities in the "international democratic organizations."

Within these international fronts the CPSU charged, the Chinese had been taking a separate position which made it difficult to arrive at decisions.

60. Within the World Peace Council, the Chinese had refused to vote on key resolutions.

61. At the IUS meeting at Tunis in February 1960, the Chinese had opposed "broader contacts with student organizations in capitalist countries" and had instead emphasized the need for "uncompromising struggle". At a WFDY meeting in March, and at the Afro-Asian conference in April, the Chinese had opposed discussion of disarmament on the ground that the "call for disarmament lulls the popular masses and demobilizes them in the struggle against imperialism."

62. As early as 1949, at the conference of Asian trade unions in Peking, the Chinese had proposed " 'unfolding bitter struggle in colonial and semi-colonial countries' " and formation of "liberation armies" under Party direction. This had been done without consulting the Parties and had helped the "imperialists" in their fight against the WFTU. The Chinese had later revised this attitude, the document said.

63. In May 1954, the Chinese Central Committee had sent to the CPSU a report of the Communist fraction of the Chinese trade unions which agreed

with the WFTU positions. However, the Chinese were opposing WFTU decisions which applied to all countries. This caused trouble between the WFTU and some CPs. "Now", the CPSU document said, "the Chinese talk of WFTU opportunism, and this threatens the unity of its ranks."

BA. Chinese Divergence from the 1957 Declaration and Peace Manifesto.

The CPSU charged the Chinese with departing from the Moscow documents of 1957 on six main counts.

(1) They had "revised" the characterization of the present "epoch" so as to make it read that this is "an epoch of wars and revolutions".

(2) They say that the "Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence", as it is spelled out in the Moscow Declaration, creates "illusions" and that "peaceful coexistence is impossible; it only gratifies the imperialists and enables them to murder the peoples of Asia and Africa with impunity."

(3) The Chinese say that the thesis in the Moscow Declaration that "the struggle for peace is the foremost task" of the Communist Parties is "erroneous and anti-Leninist" and that it encourages the delusion that there can be peace with capitalism."

(4) The Chinese reject the Moscow Declaration's thesis on " ' different forms of transition ' " as coming from an " ' incorrect understanding of imperialism. ' "

(5) The Chinese question the thesis of the Moscow Declaration

that the 20th CPSU Congress had opened " a new stage" in the international movement, and they want to reopen the question of the "cult of personality."

The Chinese had endorsed the CPSU's action regarding the "cult of Stalin",

and Mao Tse-tung himself had done so at the 1957 Moscow meetings. The

new proposal to reopen the discussion "detracts from important Party

tasks, and weakens the struggle against the consequences of the cult of

personality" in some other parties, the document declared.

(6) In violation of the principle of correct "fraternal relations"

of Communist Parties, the Chinese have criticized Parties "behind their

backs". This criticism of the policies of the CPSU "does not contribute

to the prestige or unity" of the international movement. In particular, the

Chinese had disagreed with the November 1959 "Appeal" of seventeen West

European CPs and had called this document "opportunist". In this way,

the Soviets say, the Chinese have set themselves up as the "judges over the

group of most experienced parties", and they did it in the absence of these

at
parties, at a meeting in Peking. In criticizing the CPSU itself, the Chinese
CP has not been direct, but has made use of "indirect methods and functionaries."

65. The Need for closer unity between the socialist camp and the inter-

national Communist movement. The CPSU document said that the Chinese

position threatens serious damage to the unity of the socialist camp and

that "many" Chinese actions have been "disloyal and uncomradely".

66. Although the Chinese say that the USSR should lead the "camp", behind the back of the CPSU, ^{through} they have attacked the CPSU, ~~calling~~ "trade union representatives, representatives of the national liberation movement and other representatives of the Communist parties." This shows a lack of "sincerity" and is a violation of the "principles of proletarian internationalism."

67. The document cited cases when the CPSU had disagreed with the Chinese ^{CP}, but had not intervened: the "hundred flowers" program; the Chinese abandonment [in the commune program] of the "Leninist principle of material incentive under socialism. In Soviet eyes, "loyalty to Leninism is tested not only by words but by deeds", the document said, and it cited Soviet aid to the Chinese (15 billion rubles in deliveries and 6.6 billion rubles credit).

68. The document said that it was necessary and possible for the differences between the Chinese and the Soviets to be overcome "without compromising principles." The Chinese must take into account the "interests of the world Communist movement"; dissension can only benefit "imperialism, the common enemy."

69. On 17 June, CPSU representatives met with ^{CPC} ~~SCP~~ delegates en route to the Rumanian Party Congress. The Soviets told the Chinese that they

considered the latters' "views and methods erroneous." The Chinese refused to change their stand, but said that they would be willing to "admit their errors" if a majority at the Bucharest conference "proved" them to be wrong.

70. The CPSU document said that, in view of the fact that the issues in dispute had been defined in the Peace Manifesto of 1957, signed by all Communist Parties, the CPSU considered it necessary to exchange views with representatives of all the parties.

71. The document concluded with an expression of confidence that the CQP would "weigh our comradely criticism in a Marxist way and draw the necessary conclusions, bearing in mind the interests of the entire Socialist camp and the international Communist movement, which are inseparable from the interests of the building of Communism in the Chinese Peoples Republic."

DEVELOPMENTS AFTER BUCHAREST

72. In the three months following Bucharest, the dispute continued unresolved, and indeed, there was no serious attempt to resolve it. Each side continued to argue the merits of its respective position; each continued its effort to get support within the world movement. The Soviets sent a series of letters to the Chinese criticizing Chinese propaganda activities and putting the Chinese on notice that Soviet technicians would be withdrawn during August. The Chinese replied to these letters and, on 10 September, produced a comprehensive rebuttal of the charges which the Soviets had made in the circular ^{draft} letter of 21 June. The contents of the Chinese letter of 10 September were made known to some foreign Communist leaders, just as the Soviets had done with their 21 June circular. As of mid-September, leading circles throughout the international movement were well aware of the gravity of the dispute and many were disturbed by the prospects of an international meeting, scheduled for 9 November in Moscow, at which they would be called upon to commit themselves.

73. The developments during these three months will be treated chronologically and in summary form.

JUNE

74. On 29 June both Pravda and the Peiping Peoples Daily carried editorials on the Bucharest communique that made it abundantly clear that

both Parties remained firm in their divergent views. Neither of the articles criticized the opponent, but the "principled" statements of position were clearly divergent.

75. Pravda falsely claimed that in signing the communique the entire Bloc had endorsed the ^{theses of the 20th and 21st CPSU Congresses} 1957 "~~Peace Manifesto~~" as well as the ^{proven validity} ~~of both~~ Moscow Declaration ^{and the Peace Manifesto of 1957.} and that the entire Communist movement had recognized "the correctness of the ~~theses of the Declaration and Manifesto.~~"

The article was clearly intended to create the impression that the CPSU had the full support of the world movement.

76. Peoples Daily disposed of the communique briefly, using it mainly as a peg for a lengthy presentation of the correctness of the Chinese interpretation of the Moscow Declaration, with emphasis on "revisionism" as the "main danger".

77. In late June, representatives of the French, Italian, and Danish CPs were ~~in Moscow~~ ^{and were presumably briefed} on how to handle the dispute.

JULY

78. During July the CPSU took action against Chinese propaganda activities in the USSR, arranged to withdraw Soviet technicians from China, reasserted the fundamentals of the Soviet position, and adopted a resolution which formally endorsed Khrushchev's actions at Bucharest while sharply attacking Chinese views.

79. The CQP leadership apparently held a long conference during the month. It is believed that the Chinese decided to withdraw temporarily from open disputation, to concentrate on strengthening domestic controls in order to counter Soviet pressures, and, in preparation for a resumption of open debate, to exert pressures on the international movement.

80. On 6 July, the CPSU informed the CQP that, in carrying two offensive editorials, the Chinese Russian-language journal Druzba had violated an agreement that neither country should publish articles against the other. The two articles were characterized against Marxism-Leninism and the Moscow Declaration. The Soviets told the Chinese that the Soviet publication in Peking was being stopped and they asked that Druzba also be stopped.*

81. Kommunist No. 10, signed to the press 11 July 1960, carried an important article by F. Konstantinov and K. Momdzhyan, who proceeded to uphold the CPSU positions and refute the Chinese arguments on the basis of "revolutionary dialectics" and "Creative Marxism". "Only doctrinaires, and not revolutionaries" could fail to understand the significance of peaceful

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In addition to suspending the distribution of Druzba, the Chinese illustrated periodical Kitai was dropped for at least two issues. It is not known whether or not this was also mentioned in the 6 July letter.

coexistence in the "changed conditions" of today, they said. Those who argue (as the Chinese have) that coexistence "could disarm the peoples ideologically and demobilize them" are guilty of a "blunder". Those who deny the possibility of "peaceful transition" (as the Chinese have tended to do) are guilty of "misleading" some CP's. "They can only drag these parties to the positions of sectarianism and dogmatism". Anyone who acts to create disunity in the Bloc, the authors charged, are "willy, or nilly" working against the "success of the struggle for peace and socialism...the sacred duty" of all Communists.

82. On 12 July the Central Committee of the CPSU convened in plenary session, and ~~its~~ its final resolution, dated 16 July, went far beyond a mere criticism of left-wing dogmatism. The resolution gave unusually heavy emphasis of the CPSU's approval of the conduct of the Soviet delegation to Bucharest, and it actually distorted the Bucharest ~~communiqué~~ ^{results of the debate} to make it appear that it had ^{formally endorsed the theses of the 20th and 21st CPSU Congresses and} included denunciation of "narrow nationalism". ^{but it had} For the first time, the Central Committee formally characterized views ^{as "deviations" such} as those held by the Chinese, ~~as "deviations."~~

83. The strong commitment by the Central Committee to the Khrushchev line at Bucharest reflected new, disturbing developments in Sino-Soviet relations during the two weeks following Bucharest. Military

relationships snagged, and the matter of the Soviet technicians was reaching a critical stage.

84. A Soviet military mission dispatched to China after Bucharest to conclude certain defense arrangements reportedly found that the Chinese had abruptly decided that they, and not the Russians, should control the facilities in question. A CPSU foreign section official told a leading Free World Communist in July that problems had arisen from Chinese demands for modern (presumably atomic) weapons.

85. On 21 July the CPSU sent a letter to the CCF complaining about the Chinese attitude toward Soviet technicians. According to the CPSU, the withdrawal of Soviet technicians for work at home had been requested at the end of 1956 (and/or early in 1957), on the ground that local technicians had been trained. The other Bloc countries agreed to this, but the Chinese did not. Again, when the Chinese complained about the behavior of some technicians in August 1958, the Soviets ~~had~~ considered their withdrawal, but the Chinese demurred. Recently, the CPSU letter charged, the Chinese had added to their disrespectful treatment of the technicians by circulating "anti-Marxist" literature among them in an effort to subvert them. The Chinese pamphlet entitled "Long Live Leninism", containing three April ideological refutations of the Soviet line was cited as an example of the type of subversive literature being used by the Chinese.

86. In a letter dated 25 July, without waiting for a reply from Peking, the CPSU served notice that all Soviet technicians would be withdrawn during the period 28 July - 1 September.

87. Less is known of Chinese activities during the month of July.

REF
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88. "Long Live Leninism" was widely distributed abroad in an effort to publicize the Chinese views within the world movement. A theoretical journal (Hsiang River Critic), which had played a key role during the period in the 1920's and 30's when Mao was opposing Soviet influence on Chinese Communism, was revived in the middle of July. Liu Ning-i, leading a delegation to Japan at the end of July, subsequently demonstrated by his actions in Japan the content of the hard Chinese line in foreign policy. The Chinese leadership, apparently in extended conference from 2 July to 22 July, prepared its answers to the CPSU letters, and it seems likely that the Chinese were then in favor of conciliating the Soviets as much as possible without, however, retreating from ~~principled~~ positions of principle.

AUGUST

89. Relations continued to worsen during August. The month opened with a Chinese letter (or possibly, two separate letters) dealing with the technicians and the question of publications. Later, the Chinese leadership appears again to have met and probably decided to take a harder

position against Soviet pressures. In mid-August the Chinese began again to participate in the open disputation. The CPSU continued to publish articles attacking Chinese positions and employed the Bulgarian Party leader ^{ZHIVKOV,} to push pro-Soviet, anti-Chinese theses in the international Communist journal, Problems of Peace and Socialism. A "conciliatory" letter was sent to the CCF on 20 August, but late in the month the CPSU was circulating to foreign CPs a revised and strengthened version of the 21 June letter which had been shown to foreign CP delegations at Bucharest.

89. In a letter (or letters) dated 1 August, the Chinese answered the CPSU letters of July regarding the publications and technicians.

90. The Chinese said that, although the CPSU publication in Peking ^{had been} had been writing objectionable pieces since September 1959, they had not demanded a stoppage, on the ground that they trusted their own cadres to be able to determine right from wrong. The Chinese pointed out that the U.S. Embassy in Moscow was permitted to distribute Amerika in 50,000 copies and suggested that it was "curious" that the U.S. should be able to publicize the "American way of life" and "imperialism", while the CCF should be criticized for publishing articles against "imperialism". The Chinese acknowledged that they must accede to Soviet insistence ^{but} requested reconsideration.

91. Concerning the Soviet technicians, the Chinese refuted the

CPSU charges. In 1958 the CCF had asked that the technicians be called "technical experts" rather than "advisers". This had been agreed to. The CCF had only complained about a few technicians, and this had been settled. It was not true that the advice of the technicians had been "demonstratively burnt" as the CPSU had charged; the advice had been accepted in the main. The technicians themselves had asked for Chinese literature at the very beginning, and it was not unusual that they had attended occasional lectures. The distribution of "Long Live Leninism" was not exceptionable: the technicians had not been forced to discuss it.

92. The Chinese said that if the Soviets continued to object to these practices, ~~this~~^{they} could be discussed, but the CCF did strongly object to the unilateral Soviet action as wrong^{ly} legally, morally, and politically. It constituted a violation of the Sino-Soviet treaty of Friendship. It would damage the Chinese construction program, create difficulties, weaken the Bloc, and encourage the "imperialists".

93. An Orientalists Congress, which had been long and widely-heralded by the Soviets and at which Sinology had been given high booking, opened in Moscow on 9 August--without the Chinese. Their withdrawal, without explanation, and with lame explanation by the Soviets, was probably intended to demonstrate disapproval of "opportunist" Soviet efforts to attract participants from the West.

94. Another meeting of the Chinese leadership appears to have been held between 2 and 13 August. No details are available.

95. In mid-August, Problems of Peace and Socialism carried an article by Bulgarian Party chief Todor Zhivkov, who had signally supported Khrushchev at Bucharest. Zhivkov's defense of Khrushchev's peace strategy as both necessary and feasible followed the line previously enunciated by Khrushchev, Gomulka, Novotny, and Togliatti, and indicated that the CPSU was beginning to step up its use of Problems of Peace and Socialism as a weapon in the dispute.

96. Li Fu-ch'un, Politburo member and Chairman of the State Planning Commission, reopened the Chinese campaign in the overt debate. His 16 August article in Red Flag (like the April "Long Live Leninism" article) was published in English in Peking Review, 23 August. He charged that the "modern revisionists" who had been trying to isolate China since 1958 would only isolate themselves (as the CCF had said privately to the CPSU in late 1959 or early 1960). In mid-month, ~~he~~ ^{the deputy director of the CPC's international liaison department} led a strong Chinese delegation to Habana for the Cuban Party congress, where he concentrated on lobbying among foreign delegates to line them up against the "modern revisionists".

97. Also in mid-August, a speech by Li Wei-han asserted that the Chinese were the only correct interpreters of Leninism: "The Mao Tse-tung

ideology is Marxism-Leninism in its fullest developed form in the era of socialist revolution by the proletariat." Characteristically, the speech added a second major thesis reminiscent of 1949: "Armed struggle is the principal form of waging the revolution." It is of considerable significance that this speech was not published until ²⁴ ~~18~~ September, by which time the ~~CCP~~ ^{CCP} had definitely decided upon a much more intransigent attitude toward the CPSU.

98. Meanwhile, the CPSU in mid-August was continuing to elaborate its ideological position. Following an important article by Frantsev in Pravda of 7 August against a "rebirth of views similar to those of the left-wing Communists", a leading spokesman for the foreign section of the Party, B. N. Ponomarev, declared in Pravda that peaceful coexistence was "nothing else but a higher form of class struggle." On 16 August, an article by S. Titarenko ~~who~~ had in earlier August articles come close to it, explicitly singled out the Chinese for warning against the dangers of "isolation."

99. Almost coincidentally, on 16 August Li Fu-ch'un wrote in Red Flag about the need for the Chinese to "rely mainly on our own efforts".

Sometime after mid-August
100. On ~~20 August~~ the CPSU sent what was described by a high

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Soviet official as a "conciliatory" letter to the ~~CCP~~ ^{CCP}. Nothing is known about this letter, or why the spokesman considered it "conciliatory".

Other very good evidence suggests that the Chinese saw nothing very

"conciliatory" in the Soviet actions.

101. On 26 August^x the leading CPSU expert on Communist tactics in underdeveloped countries, Ye. Zhukov, wrote in Pravda on "Some Questions of the Contemporary National Liberation Movement." This was a sharp rebuttal of Chinese hostility toward "bourgeois nationalists", which "haughty attitude", Zhukov said, constituted "sectarianism of the most dangerous kind."

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102. Late in August^x it appeared that the CPSU had circulated among the Free World CPs¹ a revised and strengthened version of the 21 June circular which had been shown to delegates at Bucharest. The CPSU seems to have told the recipients that they would now have sufficient time to digest the Soviet charges^{and} to reach clear-cut decisions prior to the scheduled meeting in Moscow in November. The letter emphasized that the CPSU intended to seek clarification and to reach a clear agreement with the CCP: this^{purpose} may have had something to do with the "conciliatory" letter mentioned above.
of 20 August.

SEPTEMBER

103. Chinese determination to stand firm on its positions, ~~was~~ demonstrated by statements in the Chinese press and at the Vietnamese Party Congress, ~~was~~ was communicated to the CPSU in the Chinese letter

of 10 September. Soviet statements during the first half of the month indicated that Moscow was also not prepared to retreat.

104. On 4 September the Chinese belatedly published the full text of a speech delivered on 22 July to the Chinese Writers Congress. The speech included a direct attack on the concept of ~~socialist~~ "humanism", which is a central theme in both the domestic and foreign programs of the CPSU.

105. The following day Li Fu-ch'un, who headed the Chinese delegation to the Vietnamese congress, delivered a speech reasserting the correctness of the basic Chinese positions. The response of the leading Soviet delegate N. A. Mukhitdinov on 11 September was a violent attack on the Chinese.

THE CHINESE LETTER OF 10 SEPTEMBER 1960

106. By far the most important development, however, was the 10 September CCP letter to the CPSU, which was outlined by the Chinese for the benefit of foreign CPs in continuation of the Chinese effort to enlist their sympathy. The letter is organized on a pattern similar to that of the 21 June CPSU circular for the purpose of countering each of the charges in that circular.

107. Chinese views on the background of the current dispute. It was not true, as the CPSU had alleged, that the CCP had agreed with the CPSU in the past and had only recently diverged from the CPSU. Actually, the

Declaration. The first draft had said nothing about the subject of state power or class struggle, but rather had outlined a purely "parliamentary path" for "transition". The CCF had sent a letter ^{of objection} ~~objecting to this~~, but, in order to save the "prestige" of the CPSU, had agreed that the Declaration should show a link between the formulations contained in the Declaration and the 20th CPSU Congress theses.*

140. At the Moscow conference, Mao had carefully specified that the CPSU should "lead" the Bloc.** This ^{preeminence} carries with it the responsibilities of leadership, the 10 September letter stated, and the CPSU should discuss matters with the other CPs on an equal basis.

141. The CCP letter, in refuting Soviet charges to the contrary, asserted that the CCF had not discussed these differences with other CPs.

142. The Chinese declared that the CPSU had gradually deviated from the Moscow Declaration and had gone back to the "wrong theses" of the 20th CPSU Congress. Khrushchev, especially, was guilty of this from September 1959, and of open criticism of the CCP and its leaders.

* A key symbol of the current dispute is the consistent Chinese avoidance of the theses of the 20th and 21st CPSU Congresses in their affirmations of the Moscow Declaration.

** The CCP and the Albanian CP have employed the term "led", rather than "headed", referring to the CPSU position within the Bloc, advisedly. The other East European satellites in general use the Soviet formula, "Camp headed by the CPSU".

The letter cited numerous examples of the incorrect CPSU attitude:

allegations that the Chinese want to maintain the cold war, characterization

of the Sino-Indian border dispute as "foolish and stupid"; insinuation that

(Mao, presumably) "an old man like one of a pair of galoshes can be kept

in a corner to be admired"; "testing stability of capitalism by arms";

Khrushchev's friendly characterizations of Eisenhower ^{has statements to} and about "1960--

a new era"; talk about banishing war; etc. Kuusinen's Lenin day article, ~~the Chinese claim~~

did not even mention the Moscow Declaration--which shows how far the

CPSU has departed from it, ~~the Chinese claim~~. Even if Khrushchev says

that no names have been mentioned in these statements, it is clear to

^{according to the Chinese,}
everyone who is meant.

14. The CCP letter defended the Chinese actions at the WFTU

meeting in Peking in June 1960 and pointed out the inconsistency of the

Soviet position: it is correct for the CPSU to attack the CCP in the presence

of non-Communists and "imperialist reporters at Warsaw and Bucharest",

but wrong for the Chinese to call a meeting of leading Communists at Peking.

Furthermore, the CCP letter reveals the main point of the Chinese objection

to the Saillant report (written with the help of a Soviet comrade, the letter

states) to the WFTU meeting: the report mentioned the free world without

quotation marks, whereas communes and the Leap Forward were put in

^{styling}
quotation marks. This constituted an open criticism of the CCP's policy.

115. According to the 10 September Chinese letter, the CPSU had sent a letter to the CQP on 2 June calling for an international meeting to resolve the differences. The CQP had agreed ~~to this~~ ^{had} but asked for time to prepare itself. Then, on 7 June, the CPSU suggested that there be held at Bucharest a preliminary conference to discuss tactics following the collapse of the Summit. The CPSU assured the CQP that no resolution would be adopted at this meeting. Again, the Chinese agreed. But at Bucharest, Khrushchev surprised the Chinese by launching a full scale attack on their positions for which they were not prepared. Instead of an attack on "imperialism", as the CPSU had proposed, the discussion was diverted to a "harmful and disruptive" attack on the CQP. After Bucharest, a press campaign was launched against the Chinese. The CQP letter criticized the CPSU for rashness and said that the latter seemed not to have understood how much this had damaged Soviet prestige as the leader of the "camp". The letter then took up the basic questions raised in the CPSU circular of 21 June.

146 "Present Epoch". The CQP letter reasserted the correctness of its assessment of the present balance of forces and its interpretation of this shift as meaning "greater opportunities for struggles for Socialism, for national liberation, for peace, to expand and to succeed." Khrushchev's

views on the significance of the shift (which Mao recognized as early as 1949) are erroneous. The CPSU and Khrushchev have deviated from the Moscow Declaration in talking about "banishing war for ever", "world without arms and weapons", "export of capital helping the development of colonial people", local wars leading "inevitably to world war", etc. The CPSU, by "attaching exclusive importance to discussions with imperialist statesmen", promotes the "personality cult." These views harm the "liberation struggle". Khrushchev overestimates the weakening of "imperialism"; and his views are "subjective", "idealist", and "left".

117. "War and peace". The CCF letter challenged the CPSU attitudes toward this question. The CPSU has turned the slogan "war is not fatalistically inevitable" into "war is fatalistically avoidable". The CPSU "always hesitates" to support "liberation struggles" and "even opposes" them. Of all the "props" for maintaining peace cited in the Moscow Declaration, the strength of the camp is the most important, but the CPSU is weakening the camp by withdrawing technicians. The letter justified Mao's "paper tiger" thesis by quoting Lenin to the effect that "Anglo-French imperialism has feet of clay". The well-known Chinese emphasis on "vigilance" and "struggle" was reiterated, and the letter argued that not the Chinese ~~X~~ but the Soviet argument about the "destruction of mankind" ~~scorn~~ ^{by} nuclear war "is to create panic and lead to surrender and blackmail."

48. "Peaceful Coexistence". In this section the Chinese letter conceded that negotiating with "imperialists" may be necessary⁵ but objected to anything that would "beautify and prettify them." It might also be necessary to compromise, but the Chinese would trust more in the efficacy^{of} "exposés¹ and mass struggles" than in the "good wishes" of the imperialists. The letter held out for what the 21st June CPSU circular had called ^{the} "third way": "world war can and must be avoided, but the alternative may not be peaceful coexistence . It may be something like what obtains at present, call it cold war or anything you like." The letter objected to specific Soviet formulations, such as calling peaceful coexistence "the highest form of class struggle"* and saying that the "upsurge of liberation struggles is the result of coexistence".** It said that Zhivkov had carried this (false) line of reasoning further in saying that "coexistence is the road to socialism."*** The Chinese attitude toward bourgeois nationalists was reaffirmed.

* See reference to the Glynchew article of November 1959, in para. 3 above.

~~Partially, a reference to the Pravda article in Pravda, 12 August 1960, See para. 78, above.~~

** Possibly, a reference to the Pravda article of 26 August 1960 by Ye. Zhukov, in which such an argument is implicit.

*** An elided excerpt from the article by Zhivkov in Problems of Peace and Socialism, August 1960.

119. "Peaceful transition". Here the Chinese claimed that the CPSU had taken a "one-sided" view, had sought ~~in~~ in the first draft of the Moscow Declaration to "evade" the hard facts of "state power, class struggle, dictatorship, smashing the state machinery", and ~~was~~ ^{had been} guilty of turning "Leninism into bourgeois humanism." The question of "peaceful transition" must not be confused with the "parliamentary path": "we should have no illusion about the possibilities of bring^g about structural changes through Parliament."

120. "Tactics in the International Mass Organizations". The CCF letter defended the Chinese attitude toward the international fronts: they should be "fighting organizations"; they must fight "imperialism, particularly U.S. imperialism"; they must "support unequivocally all national liberation struggles" and "democratic struggles inside capitalist countries"; they must be "flexible" and not merely rubber-stamp Bloc policies. But the Soviets were "all along opposed to support ~~by~~ ^{of} national liberation struggles by the World Peace Council" and the International Union of Students "nearly ~~was~~ ^{had} liquidated due to Soviet ^s insistence on the merger of reactionary students' organizations."

121. "Revisionism and Dogmatism." The Chinese letter reaffirmed the Moscow Declaration assertion that "internationally revisionism is the main danger" ^{and} ~~X~~ rebuked the CPSU for holding that "revisionism has already

been smashed'. It sought to turn around the Soviet attack on "dogmatism" by pointing out that it was "dogmatic" to attack such "concrete applications" of Marxism as the Communes and Great Leap Forward.

122. "International Solidarity" Finally, the 10 September letter returned to the CCP's views on the way the CPSU should conduct itself as the "leader" of ^{the} Communist "Camp". The relationship must be on a basis of equality and responsibility. The CPSU violated this ^{principle} when it said that "all the fifty parties at Bucharest supported us." This ^{assertion} was not true, the Chinese said: some CP^s had taken different positions. Also, it was "unfortunate" that the CPSU had raised the dispute to the level of state relations in the matter of the technicians. The letter expressed the Chinese conviction that "Socialist unity is basic, while the differences are temporary." As for the November meeting in Moscow, the Chinese believed that it would be a good thing if there could be an agreement, but they feared that one meeting might not be sufficient. Meanwhile, they would continue to emphasize issues on which agreement existed, while continuing to discuss unresolved differences.

123. Following the issuance of the 10 September CCP letter, the last development to be accounted for in this survey is the publication in mid-September of two Soviet-inspired articles in Problems of Peace and Socialism, and an article in Kommunist.

P.P.S.
 The ~~two~~ articles, by Leon Bohr and Jean Dienne, further develop the validity of the Soviet argumentation and present a number of the anti-Chinese charges. Neither writer has been identified. The names may well be pseudonyms, and the CPSU's "use of functionaries" to conceal its hand is interesting in view of the fact that it had accused the CQP of using this same device earlier.

[insert] and remainder succeeding pages
THE BLOC PARTIES

125. ~~124~~. In the first three weeks after Bucharest (i.e., prior to the CPSU plenum), the Soviet effort to get full support for their positions on the part of the other Bloc parties met with mixed success. The CPSU plenum of mid-July³ stimulated further developments in this direction.

126. ~~125~~ By mid-September the following Bloc parties were on record as formally committed to the Soviet side on the issues in dispute: Hungarian (29 June), Bulgarian (13 July), East German (24 July), Rumanian (1 August), North Korean (11 August), *Polish (15 September)*, ~~GOMUKA of Poland~~ and Novotny of Czechoslovakia early in July made statements endorsing the CPSU line. *His* ~~their~~ statements *and a similar one by GOMUKA at that time* were sufficiently satisfactory to the CPSU for publication in Pravda (8 July).

127. ~~126~~. The Mongolian Party on 4 July and the Albanian Party on the 11th adopted resolutions which clearly failed to satisfy the CPSU, and they

were ignored by the Soviet press in a 20 July roundup. The CPSU evidently exerted pressure on these two parties, for on 14 August the Mongolian party publication finally presented a vigorous criticism of "dogmatists" and aligned itself with the CPSU, ~~and~~ ^{and} on 2 August, Enver Hoxha of Albania spoke in support of the Soviet view on war and the desirability of peaceful coexistence. He did not, however, retreat from the Albanian party's firm insistence that right revisionism remains the main danger to the Communist movement, and ~~X~~ in fact the Albanian CP is clearly on the Chinese side in the dispute.

128- ~~128~~ The North Vietnamese Party at the outset indicated that it wished to remain neutral in the dispute and ~~has~~ continued to do so despite evidence of Soviet pressure. In private conversation in September, Ho Chi ^{M. n.} Minh reportedly stated that he was determined to remain neutral. He considered it important that an agreement between Mao and Khrushchev ~~was important~~ ^{be reached} before the November meeting in Moscow, but he feared that neither would give in. On the questions of "transition" and Chinese policy toward India, Ho appeared to support the Chinese views.

129- ~~129~~ In addition to the adoption of formal positions on the dispute, "explanatory" programs were observed in some Bloc countries.

130- ~~130~~ Following a conference reportedly held at Varna among Bulgarian, Hungarian, Polish, Czech, and Rumanian representatives in the last week

in July, the Bulgarian party leadership discussed the launching of a

"mass explanation" within the party in order to explain, ~~and~~ justify what

was described a feeling of "general tension bordering on panic" as a

result of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

131

~~130~~. The East German party also launched a briefing campaign

at the same time. Lower cadres were briefed on the basis of extracts

from the report of an SED delegate to Bucharest. An attempt was made

to create the impression that the dispute involved practical matters ~~x~~ rather

than basic policy considerations.

132

~~131~~. In both the Bulgarian and East German parties ~~x~~ it seems that

Party officials were told to watch out for manifestations of deviations

similar to the Chinese, and "nationalist" deviations figured in the anti-

Chinese effort in both countries.

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A Recapitulation of
 CPSU and CCP Communications *Relevant*
 to the Sino-Soviet Dispute

1. October 1959 CPSU letter to Bloc CPs defending Khrushchev's views on U.S. - Soviet relations.
2. January 1960 Chervenkov proposes discussions to Chou En-lai.
3. 6 February 1960 Oral message from CPSU to ^{CPC}CCP proposing a meeting to discuss problems.
4. Late May-early June 1960 CPSU letter to Bloc CPS and possibly other CPs, ^{concerning} (Text not available), *post-Summit situation and problems.*
5. 2 June 1960 "Sharp" CPSU letter to CCP. (Probably, ^{an 80-100} ~~the~~ page letter which the Chinese later showed to other CP representatives at Bucharest.)
6. 7 June 1960 CPSU letter to ^{CPC}CCP concerning a conference. (No details.)
7. 21 June 1960 CPSU circular letter (70 plus pages) intended to be sent to CPs detailing Soviet charges against Chinese. (Probably not sent, but was shown to CP leaders)
8. 6 July 1960 CPSU complaint (possibly, a letter) to CCP about Chinese polemical material in publications distributed in USSR.
9. 21 July 1960 CPSU letter to ^{CPC}CCP complaining about Chinese propagandizing Soviet technicians.
10. 25 July 1960 CPSU letter to ^{CPC}CCP announcing withdrawal of Soviet technicians.
11. 1 August 1960 ^{CPC}CCP reply (or replies) to CPSU complaints about Chinese publications and treatment of Soviet technicians.
12. 13 August 1960 CPSU letter (presumably to ^{CPC}CCP--no details known)
13. Second half of August 1960 CPSU "conciliatory" letter to ^{CPC}CCP.
14. Late August 1960 CPSU letter to CPs summarizing and strengthening the charges of the 21 June circular. *(May be identical with item 13)*
15. 10 September 1960 ^{plus}CCP letter (150 ~~plus~~ pages) to CPSU detailing Chinese counter-charges.